Climate Change and Common But Differentiated Responsibilities for the Ocean by Craig, Robin Kundis
SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah
Utah Law Digital Commons
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship Utah Law Scholarship
10-2017
Climate Change and Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities for the Ocean
Robin Kundis Craig
S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, robin.craig@law.utah.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Utah Law Scholarship at Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.
Recommended Citation
Craig, R.K., Climate Change and Common But Differentiated Responsibilities for the Ocean, 11:4 Carbon & Climate Law Review
325-334 (2017) (EU).
Climate Change and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities for 
the Ocean 
 
Robin Kundis Craig* 
 
 
Nations’ impacts on the ocean and their impacts on climate change are 
linked, especially given the synergistic interactions among these impacts on 
the two largest global commons—the atmosphere and the ocean. This 
article argues that climate change mitigation law, as represented 
internationally by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and its follow-on agreements, can better reflect nations’ broader 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) by taking ocean 
impacts into account—in particular, contributions to ocean acidification 
and to marine fishing. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Large parts of the Great Barrier Reef in Australia are, by most accounts, dying. In 
2015 and 2016, the reef experienced unprecedented coral bleaching, a phenomenon that 
occurs when coral polyps expel their symbiotic algae (zooxanthellae) in response to 
excessively warm waters.1 Less than nine percent of the reef escaped bleaching,2 and, in 
the areas most affected, up to 83 percent of the coral died.3 The Australian Expert Panel 
overseeing the reef ‘concluded that coral bleaching since early 2016 has changed the Reef 
fundamentally’; while ‘hope still remains for maintaining ecological function over the 
coming decades,’ the members agreed that ‘substantial areas of the Great Barrier Reef 
and the surrounding ecosystems are experiencing major long-term damage which may be 
irreversible unless action is taken now.’4 The panel’s most urgent recommendation was 
to reduce greenhouse gas emission to curb climate change impacts, but it also noted that 
the long-term sustainability plan should be modified to pursue ‘a sustainable, functional 
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1 Terry P Hughes et al, ‘Global warming and recurrent mass bleaching of corals’ (2017) 543 NATURE 373. 
2 ibid.  
3 Damien Cave and Justin Gillis, ‘Large Sections of Australia’s Great Reef Are Now Dead, Scientists Find’ 
The New York Times (New York, 15 March 2017) <www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/science/great-barrier-
reef-coral-climate-change-dieoff.html?mcubz=2> accessed 17 July 2017.  
4 Australian and Queensland Governments, ‘Reef 2050 Plan: Independent Expert Panel Communiqué 1 (5 
May 2017) <www.environment.gov.au/system/files/pages/abff0d5e-b94d-4495-b79b-
90dc52274f69/files/expert-panel-communique-5may2017.pdf> accessed 17 July 2017. 
Reef in the face of emerging cumulative impacts,’5 which include, besides climate 
change, water quality problems and fishing.6 
 
 Coral reefs are the marine ecosystems on the front line of climate change and its 
‘evil twin,’ ocean acidification. However, as the scientists watching the Great Barrier 
Reef have emphasized, cumulative and synergistic impacts in the ocean, including 
fishing, pose exacerbated and unexpectedly fast-moving threats7 to all marine 
ecosystems, threatening the largest global commons—and the largest carbon sink—on 
the planet. 
 
 Nevertheless, as a legal matter, the ocean has so far been of limited concern in 
climate change mitigation negotiations, treaties, and other agreements. This article argues 
that a marine-centric view of climate change demands a far more nuanced calculation of 
nations’ Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) in responding to climate 
change to account for contributions to ocean acidification and for marine fishing. It begins 
in Part II with a short overview of climate change’s impacts on the ocean and ocean 
acidification, including their synergistic impacts with each other and with other 
anthropogenic stressors to the marine environment. Part III then examines the role that 
CBDR currently plays in international climate change law, focusing on the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)8 and its follow-on 
agreements. It also makes the case that nations’ differential contributions to marine 
degradation should lead to: (1) a legal distinction between carbon dioxide emissions and 
emissions of other greenhouse gases; and (2) a legal recognition that marine fishing both 
exacerbates climate change and increases adaptation stress. The article concludes with 
practical examples of how this new marine-oriented CBDR could be assessed, using 
information about national emissions and fishing activity that is already collected. 
 
 
II. Climate Change, Ocean Acidification, and the Ocean 
 
 Many facets of the ocean both reflect and affect the processes of climate change.9 
This part explores three aspects of the relationships among climate change, ocean 
																																																						
5 ibid. 
6 Hughes et al (n 1) 373. 
7 For example, the devastation of the Great Barrier Reef came at least 30 years earlier than scientists were 
expecting, in large part because of the confluence of climate change warming and an especially warm El 
Niño event. Cave and Gillis (n 3). 
8 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘First steps to a safer future: Introducing The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (UNFCCC) 
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acidification, and the ocean: the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on the ocean itself; 
the implications of those impacts for marine ecosystems and human well-being; and the 
contributions of human marine activities to climate change. 
 
1. The Impacts of Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions on the Ocean 
 
 Anthropogenic additions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere have five main 
impacts on the ocean. All but one of these impacts derive primarily from global 
warming—that is, the increase in global average temperature as a result of the atmosphere 
trapping more heat.10 The last impact results from an independent chemical reactions of 
carbon dioxide in seawater and is known as ocean acidification.11 
 
 First, the ocean absorbs much of the excess heat that global warming is producing. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its 2014 reports, 
ocean warming accounts ‘for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 
and 2010 (high confidence),’ compared to ‘only about 1% stored in the atmosphere.’12 
While ocean warming is greatest at the surface, it now extends at least 3000 meters down, 
probably reaching the bottom of most parts of the ocean.13 The IPCC also projects that 
ocean warming will continue throughout the 21st century.14 
 
 Warming of the oceans has a number of follow-on consequences. For example, 
ocean currents are changing.15 Changing currents affect weather patterns,16 fish stocks, 
and marine ecosystems more generally. Arctic sea ice will continue to melt,17 and ice-
free Arctic Ocean summers are likely by mid-century,18 potentially opening that ocean to 
shipping and commerce, including fishing.  
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11 For a more expansive discussion of ocean acidification, see Robin Kundis Craig, ‘Dealing with Ocean 
Acidification: The Problem, the Clean Water Act, and State and Regional Approaches’ (2015) 90 WASH L 
REV 1583 1589-1602. 
12 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report’ (2014) 40 
[hereinafter ‘2014 IPCC Synthesis Report’]. According to the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN), ‘More than 93% of the enhanced heating since the 1970s due to the greenhouse effect and 
other human activities has been absorbed by the ocean, even affecting the deep ocean.’ Daniel Laffoley and 
JM Baxter (eds), Explaining Ocean Warming: Causes, Scale, Effects, and Consequences International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (2016) 17 <https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/46254> 
accessed 17 July 2017 [hereinafter 2016 IUCN Ocean Warming Report]. 
13 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report (n 12) 40. 
14 ibid 60. 
15 ibid. 
16 2016 IUCN Ocean Warming Report (n 12) 359. 
17 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report (n 12) 60. 
18 2016 IUCN Ocean Warming Report (n 12) 323. 
Ocean warming also affects all levels of marine biodiversity and ecosystem 
function, from micro-organisms19 and plankton20 to sea turtles21 and marine mammals.22 
In addition, ocean warming is negatively affecting most marine and coastal plants, 
including seaweeds,23 seagrasses,24 and mangroves25—which, as discussed below, can 
itself accelerate climate change. A variety of marine ecosystems, as well, are changing in 
response to ocean warming, including intertidal rocky habitats,26 coral reefs,27 and deep 
sea/open ocean ecosystems.28  ‘Observation so far suggest fishes have shifted their ranges 
by 10s to 100s of [kilometers] as the ocean has warmed,’ and ‘[o]cean warming is 
modifying the seasonality of occurrence of biological events such as spawning and 
migration. This affects fish because of mismatch in the timing of availability of their 
prey.’29 In the Arctic, ‘[s]ub-Arctic species will expand northward and compete with the 
Arctic species.’30 
 
 Second, the salinity of the ocean is changing in response to both increased 
evaporation and more runoff and ice melt. According to the IPCC, ‘It is very likely that 
regions of high surface salinity, where evaporation dominates, have become more saline, 
while regions of low salinity, where precipitation dominates, have become fresher since 
the 1950s.’31  
 
Salinity changes affect species survival and biodiversity: Species are generally 
adapted to live within certain salinity ranges, and salt concentrations outside that range 
will affect growth, reproduction, and survival.32 However, changes in salinity can also 
affect sea level rise, and ‘regional sea-level changes due to salinity were much larger than 
had been previously assumed—up to one-quarter of the size of the coincident sea-level 
changes due to temperature variations and the resulting thermal expansion of the water.’33 
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24 ibid 121. 
25 ibid 135. 
26 ibid 147. 
27 ibid 178. 
28 ibid 199. 
29 ibid 240. 
30 ibid 322. 
31 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report (n 12) 40. 
32 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ‘NOAA Ocean Service Education: Salinity’ (as 
revised 6 July 2017) 
<https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/estuaries/media/supp_estuar10c_salinity.html> accessed 17 
July 2017. 
33 Jon Cartwright, ‘Salinity changes affect sea level more than scientists thought’ (Environmental Research 
News 9 February 2015) <http://environmentalresearchweb.org/cws/article/news/60135> accessed 17 July 
2017. 
The effect goes both ways: ‘Whereas in the Pacific Ocean a freshening, or salinity 
reduction, has led to a density drop that augments thermally driven sea-level rise, in the 
Atlantic an increase in salinity has boosted density, acting against the sea-level rise due 
to temperature.’34 
 
 Third, as a result of warming and increased stratification of the ocean, the ocean’s 
dissolved oxygen content is decreasing.35 This phenomenon appears to be most 
significant for the tropics, although it is occurring in many coastal and open ocean 
regions.36 Recent research indicates that the ocean’s overall dissolved oxygen content has 
decreased by over two percent since 1960, with some areas near mid-depth oxygen-
minimum zones losing four percent per decade over the same period.37 
 
Decreased oxygen is referred to as ‘hypoxia,’ and the ocean’s hypoxic zones are 
increasing and expanding.38 Non-air-breathing marine animals (fish, shellfish, 
zooplankton, but not marine mammals or sea turtles) need dissolved oxygen to survive, 
and so hypoxia represents a threat to ocean nutrient cycles, marine biodiversity, fisheries, 
and coastal economies.39 At the extreme, hypoxia creates ocean ‘dead zones’ where no 
animal life can exist.40 
 
 Fourth, sea levels are rising. Between 1901 and 2010, global average sea level 
rose about 0.19 meters, and the rate of sea level rise is increasing.41 Both ocean warming 
and glacier melting contribute to sea level rise;42 as noted above, salinity also matters. 
The IPCC projects that sea level rise will accelerate throughout the 21st century, although 
the increase will not be uniform in all locations.43 
 
																																																						
34 ibid. 
35 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report (n 12) 41. 
36 ibid. 
37 Sunke Schmidtko, Lothar Stramma and Martin Visbeck, ‘Decline in global oceanic oxygen content 
during the past five decades’ (2017) 542 NATURE 335 335. 
38 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report (n 12) 53, fig 1.12. 
39 Schmidtko, Stramma and Visbeck (n 37) 335; Lothar Stramma et al, ‘Expansion of oxygen minimum 
zones may reduce available habitat for tropical pelagic fishes’ (2011) 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 33 33-
37; Robert J Diaz and Rutger Rosenberg, ‘Spreading dead zones and consequences for marine ecosystems’ 
(2008) 321 SCIENCE 926, 926–929; Raquel Vaquer-Sunyer and Carlos M Duarte, ‘Thresholds of hypoxia 
for marine biodiversity’ (2008) 105 PNAS 15452 15452–15457. 
40 ‘Hypoxia occurs when DO [dissolved oxygen] falls below ≤2 ml of O2/liter, at which point benthic fauna 
show aberrant behavior—for example, abandoning burrows for exposure at the sediment-water interface, 
culminating in mass mortality when DO declines below 0.5 ml of O2/liter.’ Diaz and Rosenberg (n 39) 926. 
Research indicates that ‘the number of coastal sites where hypoxia has been reported has increased with an 
exponential growth rate of 5.54% [per year] over time.’ Vaquer-Sunyer and Duarte (n 39) 15452. 
41 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report (n 12) 42. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid 62. 
 Sea level rise is primarily a threat to coastal ecosystems and settlements, although 
coastal inundation is currently less of a threat than worsening storm surge. As the IPCC 
noted in 2014, ‘[i]t is likely that extreme sea levels (for example, as experienced in storm 
surges) have increased since 1970, being mainly the result of mean sea level rise.’44 
 
 Finally, absorbed carbon dioxide is reacting chemically in the ocean to reduce the 
ocean’s pH, a phenomenon known as ocean acidification. According to the IPCC, ‘[s]ince 
the beginning of the industrial era, oceanic uptake of CO2 has resulted in acidification of 
the ocean; the pH of ocean surface water has decreased by 0.1 (high confidence),’ 
corresponding to a 26% increase in acidity, measured as hydrogen ion concentration.45 
Ocean acidification will continue into the 21st century, and under the worst scenarios 
(‘business as usual’) could decrease the ocean’s pH by another 0.30 to 0.32 units, an 
increase in acidity of 100-109 percent.46 
 
 Ocean acidification most directly affects marine creatures with shells,47 but 
pervasive changes to ocean pH can affect other species, as well. For example, fisheries in 
Alaska—and the communities who depend upon those fisheries—are at significant risk 
because of ocean acidification.48 Ocean acidification also has more subtle effects, such as 
interfering with chemical signaling among ocean species.49 According to some scientists, 
ocean acidification threatens a mass extinction event, and ‘the current rate of (mainly 
fossil fuel) CO2 release stands out as capable of driving a combination and magnitude of 
geochemical changes potentially unparalleled in the last ~300 [million years] of Earth 
history, raising the possibility that we are entering an unknown territory of marine 
ecosystem change.’50 
 
2. Implications for Marine Ecosystems and Human Well-Being 
 
 As a result of all of these impacts, marine ecosystems around the globe are already 
being affected by climate change and ocean acidification.51 The impacts most relevant to 
human well-being and to law include changes in marine species richness, changes in 
regional species abundance, impacts on large non-fish marine species (such as marine 
mammals), and changes in fishery yields.52 
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46 ibid 62. 
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48 JT Mathisa et al, ‘Ocean acidification risk assessment for Alaska’s fishery sector’ (2015) 136 PROGRESS 
IN OCEANOGRAPHY 71 71-91. 
49 Tristram D Wyatt, Jörg D Hardege and John Terschak, ‘Ocean acidification foils chemical signals’ (2014) 
346 SCIENCE 176 176. 
50 Bärbel Hönisch et al, ‘The Geological Record of Ocean Acidification’ (2012) 335 SCIENCE 1058 1062. 
51 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report (n 12) 50 fig 1.11(a). 
52 ibid 52, fig 1.12. 
 
 Importantly, many of these impacts are synergistic. For example, the ‘changes in 
temperature and ocean carbonate chemistry are considered two of the greatest threats to 
marine biodiversity, leading to changes in the physiological performance of individual 
organisms, which will in turn alter biotic interactions, community structure, and 
ecosystem functioning.’53 However, ocean warming and ocean acidification also produce 
complexly synergistic effects more intensely in combination than alone.54  
 
 In September 2015, a World Wildlife Fund study concluded that the individual 
and synergistic impacts of human activities affecting the ocean—climate change, ocean 
acidification, habitat destruction, and overfishing—had led to a 49% decline in marine 
species populations between 1970 and 2012.55 Similarly, the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has noted that ‘[o]ther non-climate human stressors such 
as fishing and pollution will interact with climate-induced changes in fish populations, 
increasing the sensitivity of marine fishes to climate stressors.’56 
 
Changes to ocean temperatures, pH, and species assemblages could well 
eliminate commercial marine fishing and drastically interfere with marine aquaculture as 
well, threatening human food security worldwide.57 In addition, the oceans supply about 
50-85% of atmospheric oxygen, mostly through the photosynthetic activity of small 
plants known as phytoplankton.58 Too much disruption of ocean chemistry and biology, 
therefore, could fundamentally change all life on Earth.59 
 
																																																						
53 Ben P Harvey, Dylan Gwynn-Jones and Pippa J Moore, ‘Meta-analysis reveals complex marine 
biological responsesto the interactive effects of ocean acidification and warming’ (2013) 3(4) Ecology & 
Evolution 1016, 1016 (citing S Doney, V Fabry, R Feely, and J Kleypas, ‘Ocean acidification: the other 
CO2 problem’ (2009) 1 ANNU REV MAR SCI 169 169–192; J Kleypas, R Buddemeier, D Archer, J Gattuso, 
C Langdon, and B Opdyke, ‘Geochemical consequences of increased atmospheric carbon dioxide on coral 
reefs’ (1999) 284 SCIENCE 118 118–120). 
54 ibid 1026. 
55 Jess Colarossi, ‘Climate Change and Overfishing Are Driving The World’s Oceans To The “Brink Of 
Collapse’ (Think Progress 18 September 2015) <https://thinkprogress.org/climate-change-and-
overfishing-are-driving-the-worlds-oceans-to-the-brink-of-collapse-2d095e127640> accessed 17 July 
2017. 
56 2016 IUCN Ocean Warming Report, (n 12) 240. 
57 See generally Robin Kundis Craig, ‘Re-Tooling Marine Food Supply Resilience in a Climate Change 
Era: Some Needed Reforms’ (2015) 38 SEATTLE U L REV 1189-1235 (discussing the growing threat to 
world food security from the overall synergistic impacts on the ocean); see also World Watch Institute, 
‘Overfishing and Climate Change, Combined, Intensify Ocean Threats’ (World Watch Institute 18 August 
2015) <www.worldwatch.org/overfishing-and-climate-change-combined-intensify-ocean-threats> 
accessed 17 July 2017. 
58 EarthSky, ‘How much do oceans add to world’s oxygen?’ (Earth Science Wire 8 June 2015) 
<http://earthsky.org/earth/how-much-do-oceans-add-to-worlds-oxygen> accessed 17 July 2017. 
59 See generally Peter C Ward, Under a Green Sky: Global Warming, the Mass Extinctions of the Past, and 
What They Can Tell Us About Our Future (Smithsonian Books 2007). 
3. Human Marine Activities as Contributors to Climate Change 
 
 Human activities in the ocean also exacerbate climate change. Marine shipping is 
one obvious example. ‘Since 1997, the International Maritime Organization (‘IMO’) has 
been developing rules concerning the reduction of the international shipping sector's 
greenhouse gas emissions within its wider role of reducing all forms of ship-sourced 
pollution.’60 Offshore oil and gas development raises similar climate change concerns.61 
 
 Marine fishing would at first blush seem to be a problem unrelated to climate 
change. However, marine overfishing can also accelerate climate change, much as 
deforestation can. Research published in September 2015 indicates that overfishing of 
large predators in the ocean, such as sharks, allows their normal prey to multiply and 
decimate marine plants (seaweeds, seagrasses)—the marine vegetation that sequesters 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.62 These marine plants, known as ‘blue carbon 
ecosystems,’ sequester carbon dioxide 40 times faster than land plants (including tropical 
rainforests), and they can keep that carbon dioxide sequestered on millennial time 
scales.63 As such, preservation and possibly expansion of these marine ecosystems should 
be a climate change mitigation strategy. 
 
 
III.  A Marine-Centric View of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in 
International Law 
 
1. Introduction to Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) 
 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) is a well-established 
concept in international environmental law. CBDR seeks to achieve equity in 
international relations64 by balancing nations’ responsibilities to redress global issues 
																																																						
60 Stathis N Palassis, ‘The IMO’s Climate Change Challenge: Application of the Principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (2014) 6 WASH & LEE J ENERGY, CLIMATE & 
ENVT 160 162-63 
61 Eg, Tim Donaghy, ‘The Climate Change Costs of Offshore Drilling’ (Greenpeace.org, 9 June 2016) 
<www.greenpeace.org/usa/research/climate-change-costs-offshore-oil-drilling> accessed 17 July 2017 
62 TB Atwood et al, ‘Predators help protect carbon stocks in blue carbon ecosystems’ (2015) 5 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 1038 1042. 
63 Sarah Sedghi, ‘Shark culling and overfishing may be contributing to climate change’ (ABC News 
Australia 29 September 2015) <www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-29/sharks-and-other-predators-help-
prevent-climate-change/6813042> accessed 17 July 2017. 
64 Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, ‘The Principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities: Origin and Scope’ (2002) [hereinafter 2002 CISDL CBDR Briefing]  
<http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf> accessed 17 July 2017. 
with their right to develop.65 The principle of CBDR thus has two ‘core elements’: (1) the 
common responsibility of nations to protect ‘the environment, or parts of it, at the 
national, regional and global levels’; and (2) the necessity of taking into account each 
nation’s particular circumstances, ‘particularly each State’s contribution to the evolution 
of a particular problem and its ability to prevent, reduce and control the threat.’66  
 
For CBDR to apply, however, environmental issues must be ‘common.’ In this 
context, ‘common’ refers to collective or common interests,67 while ‘common 
responsibilities’ refer to ‘the shared obligations of two or more States towards the 
protection of a particular environmental resource.’68 ‘Differentiated’ responsibilities, in 
turn, ‘aim[] to promote substantive equality between developing and developed States 
within a regime, rather than mere formal equality.’69 Thus, rather than subjecting all party 
States to the exact same obligations, CBDR regimes assign responsibilities based on a 
range of factors, including a nation’s level of development and its contribution to the 
problem being addressed.70  
 
2. CBDR in International Climate Change Law 
 
Formal international legal responses to climate change best date from the 
UNFCCC, which was introduced at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.71 This Convention 
has been ratified by 195 countries, and it came into force on 21 March 1994.72 The 
UNFCCC has two central frameworks for addressing climate change. First, it frames 
climate change as an environmental pollution problem.73 Second, it links climate change 
to sustainable development, acknowledging that developing nations still need to deal with 
social and economic issues such as poverty.74 
 
																																																						
65 Rowena Maguire, ‘The Role of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the 2020 Climate Regime: 
Evolving a New Understanding of Differential Commitments’ (2013) 7 CARBON & CLIMATE L REV 260 
260. 
66 2002 CISDL CBDR Briefing (n 64) 1. 
67 Maguire (n 65) 264. 
68 2002 CISDL CBDR Briefing (n 64) 1. 
69 ibid, See also Pieter Pauw et al, ‘Different Perspectives on Differentiated Responsibilities: A State-of-
the-Art Review of the Notion of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Negotiations’ 
(Discussion Paper, 2014) <www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_6.2014..pdf> accessed 17 July.    
70 ‘Differentiated’ obligations must be considered on two bases. Firstly, considerations of the level of 
economic development in a particular nation. And secondly the differing contributions to global 
environmental degradation. Maguire (n 65) 264; see also 2002 CISDL CBDR Briefing (n 64) 2 (listing 
other factors). 
71 UNFCCC (n 8). 
72 ibid. 
73 Pauw et al (n 69) 8. 
74 ibid (citation omitted). 
CBDR is one of the UNFCCC’s central principles. The Convention’s ‘ultimate 
objective’ ‘is to achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.’75 However, it seeks to achieve that common objective through 
differentiated responsibilities, dividing the parties into developed States—the 
industrialized nations that have contributed the most greenhouse gases to the 
atmosphere—and developing States, whose contributions to climate change to date have 
generally been far more limited.76 Under Article 3(1): 
 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of human kind on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.77 
 
As a result, the UNFCCC imposes primary obligations for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions on the Annex I developed nations, with financial responsibility falling on an 
overlapping list of Annex II developed nations.78 Developing nations do take on 
obligations—some of which, as will be seen, are important to the ocean—but their duties 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions have so far been extremely limited. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol reified a very ‘rough cut’ CBDR regime by creating 
greenhouse gas reduction commitments for developed (Annex I) nations only.79 In 2012, 
the Conference of the Parties in the Bali Action Plan continued to emphasize that ‘Parties’ 
efforts should be undertaken on the basis of equity and common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities . . . .’80  
																																																						
75 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 
Mach 1994) 1771 UNTS 107. 
76 As the Convention web site explains, ‘The idea is that, as they are the source of most past and current 
greenhouse gas emissions, industrialized countries are expected to do the most to cut emissions on home 
ground. They are called Annex I countries and belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). They include 12 countries with ‘economies in transition’ from Central and Eastern 
Europe. Annex I countries were expected by the year 2000 to reduce emissions to 1990 levels.’ UNFCCC 
(n 8). 
77 UNFCCC (n 75) art 3(1). 
78 ibid art 4(2).  
79 Maguire (n 65) 264-65. ‘The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (which entered into force in 2005) reinforced the 
clear divide between Annex I (generally the developed countries) and Non-Annex I parties (the developing 
countries). Most of the Annex I parties to the convention agreed on legally binding targets to limit or reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions, as listed under Annex B in the Kyoto Protocol. Non-Annex I parties also 
ratified the protocol, but it does not include binding targets for them to limit or reduce their emissions. In 
practice, this means that emissions of developing countries are allowed to grow in accordance with their 
development needs.’ Pauw et al (n 69) 9. 
80 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012: 
 
The most recent Paris Accord (December 2015) again acknowledges ‘the specific 
needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the impact of the 
implementation of response measures’81 but focuses on ‘individual nationally determined 
contributions’ (INDCs)—each Party’s self-determined emissions reductions and climate 
change adaptation goals,82 which are supposed to be in place by 2020, when the 
agreement takes effect.83 In some respects, therefore, the Paris Accord has reduced the 
UNFCCC’s sharp dichotomy with respect to CBDR.84 However, the differences between 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries continue; for example, the Paris Accord emphasizes 
the importance of financing and technology transfer for developing nations85 while 
adding new loss and damage provisions for them.86 As the United Nations has 
summarized, ‘The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is reflected in 
this Agreement.’87 
 
3. An Ocean-Centric View of CBDR in the Anthropocene 
 
To date, the application of CBDR to climate change has focused almost 
exclusively on two factors: (1) nations’ actual greenhouse emissions; and (2) each 
nation’s status as ‘developed’ or ‘developing.’88 To be sure, assessing CBDR using these 
two factors is already both scientifically and politically complex enough to engender 
repeated and often heated international negotiations.89 Nevertheless, this CBDR calculus 
frames a nation’s UNFCCC-relevant environmental contribution solely in terms of the 
																																																						
Addendum: Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its eighteenth session’ (28 February 
2013) 3 ¶2 <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf#page=3> accessed 17 July. 
81 ibid 2. 
82 ibid 3-4. 
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carbon-equivalents that it emits into the atmosphere, ignoring any disproportionate 
synergistic environmental impacts that a particular nation might be imposing on the rest 
of the world.  The potential infirmities of this assessment framework are already evident 
in the fact that the international community has promoted additional programs to protect 
carbon sinks, such as the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) program and its goal of reducing deforestation.90  
 
The connection between humans’ ocean activities and climate change is already 
challenging the UNFCCC’s concept of CBDR. For example, with respect to marine 
shipping, the IMO has long followed the principle that all ocean-going ships of similar 
size and design should be subject to the same environmental standards—i.e., that CBDR 
is not relevant.91 Stathis Palassis has chronicled the growing collision between climate 
change CBDR as envisioned under the UNFCCC and the IMO’s attempts to control 
greenhouse gas emissions from ships, concluding that ‘that the twin goals of 
differentiation and uniformity do not sit comfortably together.’92 
 
Global marine fishing and ocean acidification, however, have generally been 
exempted from the climate change CBDR discussion, despite their direct and indirect 
connections to climate change. A marine-centric view of climate change regulation would 
take nations’ contributions to each into account when assessing CBDR. 
 
a. Marine Fishing and CBDR 
 
As is true of terrestrial deforestation, loss of marine plant ecosystems (as noted, 
often referred to as ‘blue carbon’ ecosystems) releases carbon dioxide and reduces the 
world’s carbon sinks. Indeed, losing one percent of marine plant ecosystems is the 
equivalent of releasing 460 million tonnes of carbon per year.93  
 
Thus, reducing the loss of these ecosystems is directly relevant to mitigating 
climate change and should be part of the UNFCCC’s climate change CBDR. As noted, 
moreover, marine fishing contributes to climate change by reducing these ecosystems and 
hence provides one measure of how a nation is directly impacting climate change. 
 
Beyond climate change mitigation, however, accounting for marine fishing also 
implements other duties under the UNFCCC. UNFCCC Section 4(1) imposes a number 
of duties on all Parties, ‘taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives 
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and circumstances,’ and three of these duties are particularly relevant to the ocean. First, 
all Parties agree to ‘[p]romote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the 
conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse 
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,’ including explicitly the ocean and marine 
and coastal ecosystems.94 Second, all Parties explicitly agree to ‘[c]ooperate in preparing 
for adaptation to the impacts of climate change,’ including explicitly through coastal 
management.95 Finally, Parties agree to ‘[t]ake climate change considerations into 
account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental 
policies and actions.’96 As such, and given marine fishing’s synergistic impacts with 
climate change in the ocean, it makes sense to include a nation’s marine fishing impact 
as part of the Paris Accord’s INDCs. 
 
4. Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Ocean Acidification, and CBDR 
 
While carbon dioxide emissions are relevant to both climate change and ocean 
acidification, the impacts of these two phenomena are nevertheless both different and 
synergistic. Climate change’s impacts on the oceans are largely physical—increasing 
temperatures and changing currents—producing the suite of follow-on impacts discussed 
above. Ocean acidification, in turn, produces a fundamental change in ocean chemistry.97  
 
Nevertheless, these processes can interact and reinforce each other, creating 
positive feedback loops that accelerate the degradation of the oceans, the loss of marine 
biodiversity, and the progress of climate change. For example, a warming ocean can 
absorb less carbon dioxide, and hence the increasing impacts of climate change on the 
ocean are undermining the ocean’s ability to mitigate climate change’s impacts on the 
rest of the world. Overall, ‘the open ocean is projected to absorb a decreasing fraction of 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions as those emissions increase,’ leaving 30% to 69% of 21st-
century carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere, depending on future emissions 
scenario.98 At the same time, climate change-driven changes to ocean currents cause 
increased upwellings of nutrients from the ocean floor, which in turn generally exacerbate 
ocean acidification.99 
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The benefit of legally linking of climate change and ocean acidification is perhaps 
obvious: ocean acidification is caused entirely, and climate change primarily, by 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide.100 Therefore, it makes eminent sense to 
couple the international regulatory response to these two environmental phenomena 
under the UNFCCC.101  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
To date, the UNFCCC CBDR calculus has done very little even to consider ocean 
acidification,102 while including fisheries within this framework appears to be on no one’s 
agenda. However, both considerations are readily workable, and their incorporation 
would reveal some nations to be ‘triple threats’ while most of the rest are more nuanced 
contributors to increasingly synergistic problems in the atmospheric/oceanic global 
commons. 
 
Ocean acidification is arguably the easier of the two to incorporate into the 
UNFCCC framework. However, the Kyoto Protocol and its successors allow climate 
change mitigation efforts to apply to four greenhouse gases and two groups of other gases, 
whereas only carbon dioxide emissions are relevant to ocean acidification.103 As a result, 
advocates seeking to incorporate ocean acidification into the UNFCCC have argued that 
future UNFCCC protocols and implementing agreements should distinguish between 
carbon dioxide and other relevant greenhouse gas emissions to more effectively 
acknowledge the problem of ocean acidification.104  
 
Some have suggested that the UNFCCC be modified to focus solely on carbon 
dioxide, leaving the other greenhouse gases to a different treaty.105 However, the dual 
role of carbon dioxide in causing both climate change and ocean acidification could 
instead become a means for more finely differentiating among nations’ climate change 
CBDR. For example, Nigeria emits more non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases than 
either Japan or Germany,106 but Japan and Germany are ranked fifth and sixth, 
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respectively, in terms of nations’ overall carbon dioxide emissions, while Nigeria doesn’t 
even make the list of top 20 emitters.107 A climate change CBDR calculus that considered 
ocean acidification would thus hold Japan and Germany doubly (climate change and 
ocean acidification) responsible because of these countries’ significant carbon dioxide 
emissions, while Nigeria’s CBDR would be based solely on its contribution to climate 
change. 
 
Including marine fishing effort into nations’ climate change CBDR would need 
to be more nuanced, especially at first, given the more attenuated contribution of marine 
fishing to climate change and its development connection to individual nations’ food 
security. As a first step, as Party nations submit and modify their INDCs under the Paris 
Accord, those national commitments could include fishing policies and reflect the 
synergistic impacts of climate change, ocean acidification, and overfishing. 
 
Nevertheless, including a nation’s marine fishing effort into its climate change 
CBDR is relatively easily done because information about each nation’s contribution is 
readily available: Every two years the FAO publishes The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture, summarizing nations’ individual fishing efforts.108 Adding marine fishing 
to the climate change CBDR calculus would significantly differentiate certain nations. 
The FAO’s latest (2016) report lists the top 25 countries for marine wild capture fisheries, 
based on 2013 and 2014 catch data, as (in descending order): China; Indonesia; United 
States; Russian Federation; Japan; Peru; India; Viet Nam; Myanmar; Norway; Chile; 
Philippines; Republic of Korea; Thailand; Malaysia; Mexico; Morocco; Spain; Iceland; 
Taiwan Province of China; Canada; Argentina; United Kingdom; Denmark; and 
Ecuador.109 Most importantly for CDBR calculations, this is an overlapping but overall 
very different list of ‘top nations’ than usually arises in the climate change context. It also 
underscores the fact that the UNFCCC’s ‘rough cut’ of developing nations elides some 
important economic and environmental impact differences among the non-Annex I 
nations, especially with respect to China and India.  
 
An ocean-centric climate change CBDR reveals that some nations (China, United 
States, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia) are multiple contributors to the synergies among 
climate change, ocean acidification, and overfishing, while others that often escape 
climate change blame (Myanmar, Malaysia)—and may even be viewed as climate change 
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victims110—are in fact contributing significantly to those more comprehensive global 
interactions and complexities. Thus, incorporating marine fishing and ocean acidification 
into the UNFCCC’s climate change CBDR would help to meaningfully differentiate 
nations while simultaneously better reflecting the full spectrum of responsibilities that 
nations have agreed to address under that Convention. 
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